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BENCH VERSUS TRENCH: A JUDGE AND AN ACADEMIC
DEBATE THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
Abstract

The following dialog on the proper roles of government and universities in meeting a vexing social challenge
grew out of an evening of wine and cordial disagreement between two friends with different backgrounds and
perspectives. The problem: How does the nation provide equal educational opportunity in an ethnically
diverse democracy with both a troubled history of racial injustice and a constitutional commitment to
individual freedom. Readers are invited to decide for themselves how justice can be found.
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BENCH VERSUS TRENCH: A JUDGE AND AN ACADEMIC DEBATE THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES

JUDGE HOFFMAN: I sympathize with college admissions officers because their job, at
least at the margins, is anything but objective. But that very lack of objectivity is what
makes the government's use of race so dangerous. It is one thing to give state colleges
the freedom to make highly subjective, almost gestalt, decisions about admissions using
every bit of information available about a candidate (including race and height and
spelling proficiency), but quite another to allow them to measure the impact of those bits
of information, and then adjust their weight, all in an effort to make sure the student body
is "diverse." Ensuring "diversity" in this manner is just post-Bakke newspeak for quotas.

PROFESSOR GOLDSMITH: These cases were about the role of the government in the
guise of public universities. But as the Court reminded us, "given the important purpose
of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with
the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition." Concordant with this tradition, most faculty members and members of boards
of regents at state universities see themselves less as agents of state government than as
representatives of an even older institution whose dual mission is the exploration of new
knowledge and the education of the young. (You may deem this irrelevant, but in this
imperfect world it is no more irrelevant than the reflections of personal experience that so
color Justice Thomas’s dissent.)

HOFFMAN: You are wrong to suggest that the Court was, at least explicitly, fashioning
some sort of exception to equal protection when it comes to the ancient tradition of
education. I suppose the ancient tradition of making a living might also justify less
scrutiny when it comes to government doling out contracts, but we know from Adarand
that that is not correct. No, if you are going to defend these opinions you’ll need to do so
in classical equal protection fashion, just as the majority tries to do. After paying lip
service to the unique role of higher education, the majority proceeds quite traditionally:
first concluding that diversity is a compelling state interest and then concluding that the
Michigan Law School’s method of achieving that compelling state interest was narrowly
tailored. They are wrong on at least the first count. The Equal Protection Clause was,
and should continue to be, all about disabling government from making the very kind of
group-based decisions inherent in the word “diversity.”

GOLDSMITH: The history of the Equal Protection Clause has not been characterized by
clarity of application, and its interpretation in the domain of education has been evolving
since 1868. In hindsight, Plessy v Fergusson seems an abomination and Brown v Board
of Education of Topeka an enormous step away from generations of rank discrimination.
In the ensuing social change—where race, economic status, history, and access to quality
education are mercilessly entangled—many colleges and universities have sought to
extend the reach of educational opportunity. This initiative has put these institutions of
higher education at the forefront of social change. Inevitably, conflicting interests have
been seen to clash: both the interests of different individuals and the interests of
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individuals as they seem to conflict with the collective interests of society. This is what
keeps the issue alive.

HOFFMAN: Being in the “forefront of social change” is not synonymous with “being
constitutional.” The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to restrain government, even
(and perhaps especially) a well-intentioned government, from encroaching on individual
rights. The equal protection cases have made it clear that among these presumptively unencroachable rights is the right to have government actions, both benefits and detriments,
distributed without regard to race. To overcome this presumption, the state must show a
compelling state interest and must also show that the race-conscious program is narrowly
tailored to meet that compelling state interest. So tell me again, what is compelling about
racial diversity in the classroom?

GOLDSMITH: Students learn an enormous amount from each other. Much of this
learning is informal, but it is no less important for life than what is encountered in the
classroom. Justice Scalia argues that classroom diversity is a goal of elitist institutions,
and Justice Thomas puts it down as “racial aesthetics.” Both of these views trivialize the
educational process as well as an educational goal of great importance to our pluralistic
democracy. To the extent that affirmative action is a hallmark of “elitist” institutions that
educate a disproportionate share of our future leaders, I would argue that the state has an
even more compelling interest. The decision of the Court was in fact strongly influenced
by testimony that the educational process and educational outcomes are positively
influenced by classroom diversity. My own experience as a teacher in an “elitist”

3

university is consistent with this view, and from the role of education, the distinction
between public and private is immaterial.

HOFFMAN: OK. So Yale is a better university as a result of a more diverse student
population.

I accept that proposition, and, in any event, as a private university its

judgments on these matters are not generally subject to government review. But if it
were a public university, supported by taxpayers, a second question has to be asked—are
its admissions policies fair? Certainly, Yale was a fairer university once all the old
racial, gender, religious and ethnic barriers were eliminated. But is it a fairer university
when the old barriers are turned into gateways for some races and new barriers for
others?

GOLDSMITH: You bet it is fairer! It is fairer because many institutions have become
proactive in seeking talent and promise in places that were formerly ignored: public
schools, among young women, and among previously underrepresented ethnic, racial,
and economic groups. To characterize expanded opportunity for some as barriers for
others bestows special privilege on groups that have been previous beneficiaries of
discrimination.

HOFFMAN: But of course because the spaces are limited, one race’s gateway is in fact
another race’s barrier. The majority buys into this remarkable piece of pseudo-science
that there is an apparently unspecifiable “critical mass” of numbers of students of any
given race necessary to achieve diversity.
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How is that “critical mass” analytically

different from a quota, except that with quotas at least the institutions are admitting what
they are doing. If Barbara Grutter was rejected by the Michigan Law School because it
needed one more minority student to reach “critical mass,” how was her injury
constitutionally different from the injury suffered by Allan Bakke? Or by the black
applicant who gets denied admission in favor of an equally qualified white applicant
when the admissions officer overshoots the critical mass for blacks? What in the world is
wrong with requiring state colleges and universities to base their first order admission
decisions on well-recognized predictive indicators, like SAT scores and high school
grades, and then, at the margins, to allow them subjective discretion to consider all other
factors other than those forbidden by the Constitution?

GOLDSMITH: Although informed by experience, every aspect of education is more an
art than a science, so let’s not hide behind the pejorative “pseudo-science.” It’s true that
the national standardized tests, and high school grades, have predictive value.

For

example, high SAT scores correlate with future grades, particularly during the first two
years of college.

The problem is that they also correlate with past educational

opportunity, including access to commercial courses that offer to increase a student’s
SAT score by up to 100 points. An admissions system that limits judgment of a young
person’s potential to a single number is an inadequate measure of promise while also
creating a false sense of entitlement for both admission and scholarship support.

HOFFMAN: Aha! Now we are the crux of the matter. The University of Michigan Law
School’s affirmative action plan is constitutional because diversity is a compelling state

5

interest (which, as I’ve argued above, assumes away the constitutional issue), and
because, as a result of past discrimination, diversity could not be achieved without some
measure of preference given to members of groups that suffered that past discrimination.
At least that is an honest explanation. Unfortunately, that “preference” is nothing other
than our unconstitutional friend, the quota.

GOLDSMITH: Affirmative action, as approved by the Court and as practiced by the
University of Michigan Law School and other “elitist” institutions, is an effort to employ
a richer set of predictive criteria that can compensate to some extent for economic
disparities in opportunity. These, for example, can include evidence of leadership or
involvement in activities that convey interest and concern about important social issues.
They have nothing to do with your example of “height,” or indeed skin color per se. In
this context race is a social concept that embraces a dimension of experience that is
relevant to the desire for classroom diversity. There is no numerical quota assigned to
any applicant group, which was crucial to the Law School’s admission process surviving
the Court’s close scrutiny. I have argued above that in our pluralistic democracy,
expanding the search for talent is essentially a moral act. In this context the concept of
“critical mass” expresses the educationally valid goal of eliminating the improper, and
indeed unnecessary burden of tokenism. This requires the honest expectation that every
student that is admitted can do the work, benefit from the experience, contribute to the
education of others, and graduate on time. The resulting diversity is in the interests of all
the students who are admitted and it is in the interests of society.
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HOFFMAN: But of course it is not in the interests of the students denied admission
because of their race, and that’s the constitutional rub.

GOLDSMITH: What’s all the fuss is about? During the six years from 1995-2000, the
University of Michigan Law School admitted an average of 1226 students from an
average applicant pool of 3604, for an admission rate of 34%. The average number of
African-Americans admitted per year was 100, or 32% of those applying. Chief Justice
Rehnquist interprets these numbers as evidence for a quota, but a more obvious
alternative would be that the system comes close to being race-neutral. Justice Thomas
makes much of the 4-5(!) African-Americans admitted each year with LSAT scores
below the national average, although there were also some white students admitted with
below average scores. My conclusion from these numbers is that the Law School’s use
of race along with other factors is indeed tinkering at the margins, although tinkering for
an appropriate and important educational purpose.

HOFFMAN: So now “tinkering at the margins” is the compelling state interest?

GOLDSMITH: No. The compelling state interest is the quality of education as it impacts
the larger social scene. But you are straying from my argument. With an average of
2378 applicants who were rejected each year, some of this number, likely even many,
were qualified for admission. For any one of the 1857 whites to attribute their rejection
to the success of 100 African-Americans, however, indicates a sense of privilege that
itself verges on racism.
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HOFFMAN: It verges on racism only because the government is using race to make
admissions decisions. It was no comfort to Allan Bakke that only a handful of minority
applicants displaced him, any more than it was comfort to a qualified Jewish applicant at
the turn of the century that Yale didn’t accept Jews and that his place was taken by a
single hypothetical Gentile. Only a system designed by clever and shameless lawyers
could possibly be called “race-neutral” when it uses race to reach “critical masses” of
racial diversity. You would be better off re-fighting the quota battle. To correct past
racial prejudice, and to meet the current state interest in diversity, why can’t state
universities simply say “We want our campus to look like America, so we will design
admissions systems that will insure a set percentage of students from each cognizable
racial category?”

The answer, of course, is that the Constitution demands the

government’s racial neutrality. Well-intentioned social policies aimed at correcting 400
years of race discrimination by imposing 25 years of government reverse discrimination
are simply not the kind of compelling state interest for which we should scuttle our
profound commitment to equal protection.

GOLDSMITH: If we have such a profound commitment to the equal protection clause,
perhaps we should also pay more attention to the economic conditions that lead to
disparity of opportunity in the first place. Brown v Board of Education called attention to
that dimension of the problem. But I think it is an error to view affirmative action as
correcting past injustice. Nothing can correct the past. What we can do is look at the
present and think about the future. The present disparity of opportunity is a reality that
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can be addressed by seeking talent and promise in ways that go beyond metrics that,
however useful, are known to restrict the search. This is not discrimination, reverse or
otherwise. What the next 25 years will bring remains an open question.

Morris B. Hoffman is a state trial judge in Denver, Colorado, and the unofficial judge-inresidence at the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research, where he first met
Professor Goldsmith.

His views here do not necessarily reflect the views of his

colleagues on his Court, nor, obviously, his colleagues at Gruter. He forgives Professor
Goldsmith’s claim to be in the “trenches” on this issue; after all, how often can academics
make such a claim?

Timothy H. Goldsmith is Professor Emeritus, Department of Molecular, Cellular and
Developmental Biology, Yale University and a biologist critic of legal enthusiasms. He
regularly participated in graduate biology admissions decisions at Yale, where
undergraduate admissions are the responsibility of an admissions staff with the training
and experience to select each class from a sea of applications roughly ten times larger
than the number of available places. He forgives Judge Hoffman everything, knowing
that even Rhesus Macaques find it necessary to reconcile.

Judge Hoffman and Professor Goldsmith collaborated on an essay entitled “The
Biological Roots of Punishment,” which will appear in the March 2004 issue of the Ohio
State Journal of Criminal Law.
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